Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and Australia on the Framework for Security Cooperation

Indonesia`s approach to foreign policy has been strongly influenced by the country`s experience of gaining independence from the Netherlands in armed struggle and then maintaining that independence in a world of superpower competition. The new Indonesian Republic engaged in a “free and active” foreign policy in 1948. Indonesia`s early foreign policy focused on opposing colonialism and gaining an international position away from the dominant competition between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The hosting of the Bandung Conference of Non-Aligned Countries in 1955 and the support for the Non-Aligned Movement after its establishment in 1961 largely reflected these priorities. Beginning in the late 1950s, Indonesia`s foreign policy became much more assertive in the era of the Seoul government`s “managed democracy,” as anti-colonial rhetoric increased and from 1963 attempts were made to oppose the development of the Federation of Malaysia. Malaysia`s period of “confrontation” led to tensions both between Indonesia`s immediate neighbors and between other Southeast Asian countries and nearby, including Australia, which deployed combat troops to support Malaysia. Indonesia`s record of sustained economic growth has given its leaders greater confidence in their country`s international position (between 1980 and 1993, the country recorded an average annual growth of 5.8%, GDP was estimated at $US 144.7 billion in 1994, and GDP per capita for the estimated population of 187 million is expected to reach $US,1000 by 1997)(7). Indonesian economic policies from the mid-1980s onwards also began to intensify deregulation efforts and promote more open engagement in the wider regional and international economy. Indonesia therefore became increasingly interested in regional economic cooperation and joined the Cairns Group of Agricultural Fair Trading Countries in 1986 and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Group in 1989. The announcement of the Security Agreement between Australia and the Republic of Indonesia, signed on 18 December 1995, is one of the most important recent developments in Australian foreign and defence policy. The agreement is important because it means that Australia – which already has formal associations with New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Malaysia and Singapore – now has treaties or arrangements with all its major close neighbours. The deal also sparked some controversy as it was negotiated in secret and was only revealed shortly before it was signed. The agreement can also be seen as the result of the Australian government`s efforts to play and play a role in regional affairs.

Given Australia`s contribution to cambodia`s peace settlement and its important role in stimulating APEC, the agreement not only implies recognition of the importance Indonesia attaches to its relations with Australia, but also reaffirms Australia`s presence as a major power linked to the network of relations in Southeast Asia and the wider Asian region. A Time Magazine commentator noted that Australia`s initiatives on APEC and the security deal with Indonesia “have done more to raise Australia`s awareness of the region than most observers would have thought possible a decade ago.” (16) Indonesia`s departure from its traditional approach to foreign policy and signing a bilateral security agreement with Australia can be seen as a significant achievement of the Australian Government. President Suharto personally advocated for the deal (which was negotiated without the knowledge of Foreign Minister Ali Alatas), a commitment that can be understood in the context of his close ties with then-Prime Minister Paul Keating and Keating`s support for President Suharto on issues such as hosting the APEC summit in Indonesia in 1994. and in the dispute between Indonesia and the United States over human rights issues in 1993. (17) The third article of the Agreement provides for `mutually beneficial security cooperation measures` in the areas to be determined. In the context of these difficult relations between two very different countries, significant progress has been made in the development of Australian-Indonesian relations since the late 1980s. The two governments have sought to give more substance to relations by building on economic, cultural and security relations, with regular discussions at the ministerial and official level between the two governments since 1989. The 1989 Timor Gap Treaty was controversial in Australia, but gave both governments the opportunity to gain a clear commercial advantage from developing ties.

Progress has also been made in a number of other agreements in areas such as double taxation, extradition, fisheries, investment protection, copyright protection and technical cooperation. At the security level, links with defence cooperation have expanded, of which the participation of Indonesian troops in the Kangaroo 95 defence exercises was a striking example. Indonesia is also the second largest recipient of Australian aid, receiving various forms of development assistance totalling $129 million in 1995-96. (13) The scope of cooperation under this Agreement includes:defence cooperation, in recognition of the long-term mutual benefits of closer professional cooperation between its defence forces1. regular consultations on defence and security issues of common interest; and their respective defence policies;2. Promote the development and capacity-building of the defence institutions and armed forces of both sides, including through military training, exercises, study visits and exchanges, the application of scientific methods in support of capacity building and management, and other mutually beneficial related activities;3. Facilitate cooperation in the field of mutually beneficial activities Defence technologies and capabilities, including joint design, development, production, marketing and technology transfer, as well as the development of mutually agreed joint projects. Law enforcement cooperation Recognising the importance of effective cooperation in the fight against cross-border crime affecting the security of both parties4. regular consultations and dialogues with a view to strengthening links between institutions and officials at all levels; 5. cooperation to strengthen the capacity of law enforcement officials to prevent and combat cross-border crime, 6. strengthen and intensify police cooperation between police authorities, including through joint and coordinated operations;7.

cooperation between competent institutions and authorities, including law enforcement authorities, in preventing and combating cross-border crime; in particular, offences related to: a. trafficking in and trafficking in human beings; b. money laundering; c. the financing of terrorism;d. corruption;e. illegal fishing;f. cybercrime; g. Illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances and their precursors; h.

illicit trafficking in arms, ammunition, explosives and other dangerous substances and their illicit manufacture; And me. Other types of crimes, if both parties deem it necessary. Counter-terrorism cooperationCommitment to the importance of close and continuous cooperation to combat and eradicate international terrorism through communication, cooperation and action at all levels, 8. Individually and collectively, do everything in its power to eradicate international terrorism and extremism, its roots and causes, as well as those who support or commit criminal acts of violence, bring to justice in accordance with international law and their respective national laws;9 further strengthen cooperation in the fight against international terrorism, including through rapid, practical and effective responses to terrorist threats and attacks; exchange of intelligence and information; support for road safety, immigration and border control; and effective counter-terrorism strategies and regulatory frameworks;10. Strengthen cooperation in law enforcement, defence, intelligence and national security to address terrorist threats;11. . .